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Contested Chinese Dreams of AI? Public Discourse about Artificial 
Intelligence on WeChat and People’s Daily Online  
Artificial intelligence (AI) has become a prominent public issue, particularly in China, 
where the government has announced plans to turn the country into a global AI power. 
This study analyses public discourse about AI in China through the conceptual lens of 
public spheres theory and counter-public spheres. It compares the official AI narrative on 
People’s Daily Online with public discussion about AI on the social medium WeChat, 
where we assumed that official views would be challenged. Using a combination of 
qualitative and computational methods, 140,000 AI-related articles published between 
2015 and 2018 were studied. Findings reveal that AI-related discourse on WeChat is 
surprisingly similar to that on People’s Daily Online. That is, it is dominated by industry 
and political actors, such as government agencies and technology companies, and is 
mostly characterized by discussions about the economic potential of the technology, with 
strongly positive evaluations, and little critical debate. 
Keywords: artificial intelligence, WeChat, science communication, public sphere, counter 
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1. Introduction 
Since 2015, the Chinese Communist Party, led by President Xi Jinping, has 
promoted the ‘Chinese Dream’ (中国梦): the party’s vision of turning China into a strong 
nation and a cyber-superpower (China Daily, 2015). As a step in realising this vision, 
the development of artificial intelligence (AI) sectors has been mandated by the ruling 
party, who have vowed to turn China into a global hub of AI innovation by 2030 (CSC, 
2015; Deng, 2018).  
Alongside its purported economic benefits (Rao et al., 2017), however, AI carries 
significant risks and challenges. For instance, it is estimated that over 50 percent of 
Chinese jobs may become automated in the future – an outcome that could affect over 
390 million employees (Manyika et al., 2017: 9). Moreover, the government’s potential 
use of AI for mass surveillance and automated weaponry is another common source of 
concern among researchers and commentators (Chen, 2018; Larson, 2018; Jacobs, 
2018). 
In this debate about state-fostered AI development in China, we wondered how the 
Chinese public viewed the government’s position. This speculation led to our research 
question: To what extent do social media serve as a counter-public wherein the official 
narratives around China’s national AI programs are challenged? To address this 
question, our study interrogated the discursive contestation of AI on two platforms: 
People’s Daily Online (PD) and WeChat. 
As the online portal for the People’s Daily – China’s largest newspaper group (Liang, 
2018) – PD broadcasts official messages from the central government. As a mouthpiece 
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC), its editorials and 
commentaries represent the official viewpoints of the Chinese authorities (Wu, 2014). 
WeChat, on the other hand, hosting over one billion active users monthly, is the most 
popular social media platform in China (Xinhua, 2018). It has over 12 million users on 
its ‘public account platform’ (公众账号平台) – a service that allows both individuals and 
organisations to publish articles1 that are visible to all WeChat users (Xinhua, 2017). 
These public accounts now serve as a primary source of news and other forms of 
information for Chinese internet users (Yi & Cheng, 2015; Zhao, 2014).  
To analyse AI discourse in China, we collected over 140,000 AI-related articles from 
WeChat and PD between 2015 and 2018. To examine these articles, we focused on 
three dimensions that were identified in prior analyses of debates about science-related 
issues in the public sphere: standing, framing, and positioning (Ferree et al., 2002; 
Schäfer, 2009; Gerhards & Schäfer, 2010). These three dimensions were adopted as the 
theoretical and analytical framework for our study. To operationalise this framework, 
we used a combination of qualitative analysis and computational methods, including 
topic modelling and sentiment analysis.  
2. Conceptual Framework  
2.1 Science and the public sphere  
The public sphere has been conceptualized as a communicative sphere, in which 
matters of common concern are discussed and opinions formed, and where all 
proceedings are open to the public (cf. Schäfer, 2015). This concept of the public sphere 
 
1 WeChat articles published by public accounts have various styles. In most cases, they look 
like news articles or long blog posts.  
has been advanced in political and communication theories over several decades 
(Habermas et al., 1974; Hauser, 1999; Keane, 1995), and has also been introduced to 
research in science and technology (Gauchat, 2012).  
The Sociology of Science, Science and Technology Studies (STS), and other social-
scientific analyses of science, have long argued that rhetoric and politics are constitutive 
of the scientific enterprise (Foucault, 1972; Latour, 1993; Mosco, 2004). Technologies 
are, according to Mosco (2004: 118), ‘mutually constituted out of a culture that creates 
meaning and a political economy that empowers it.’ In this context, the concept of the 
public sphere serves as a conceptual heuristic to interrogate the intersection between 
meaning creation and power contestation around science and technology. 
Gerhards and Schäfer (2009) introduce the concept of the ‘scientific public sphere’ to 
discuss different models of public communication, wherein public opinion of, and 
societal reactions to science are constructed. They argue that in public spheres, different 
issues, including science and technology, are publicly discussed, and ultimately 
evaluated. These public discourses, and their resulting evaluations, influence the 
implementation of a given technology. In the public sphere, and particularly in mediated 
platforms such as news media or social media, different stakeholders can position their 
views on, and evaluations of a technology. In so doing, they endeavour to make their 
views pervasive, in order to legitimize or undermine the issue in question (Gerhards & 
Schäfer, 2009). 
While Gerhards and Schäfer analyse Western democracies, their argument is not limited 
to democratic countries. For a single-party authoritarian country like China, garnering 
consent for science and technology projects is just as, if not more, necessary. Because 
the central government plans and finances China’s major science and technology 
projects, the legitimacy of these projects is linked to the legitimacy of the ruling party. 
Thus, mainstream media, such as PD, often function as the party’s communication 
apparatus to influence and guide public opinion (Zhao, 1998; Wu, 2014). In this way, 
the government exerts its hegemony over a considerable portion of the public sphere.  
At the same time, this top-down hegemony can be challenged by dissenting voices from 
civil society (Yang & Calhoun, 2007) or grassroots activists (Kay, Zhao, & Sui, 2015). 
This bottom-up resistance can constitute counter-public spheres (Negt and Kluge, 1972; 
Fraser, 1990; Downey & Fenton, 2003) – forms of collective expression that respond to, 
and potentially challenge mainstream public discourse (Downey & Fenton, 2003: 194). 
Counter-public spheres often emerge when this mainstream public discourse fails to 
provide a rational or critical discourse about an issue of common concern (Calhoun, 
1993). As outlined by prior studies on China’s public sphere, new information and 
communication technologies, and social media in particular, have contributed to the 
emergence of counter-public spheres in that country (Lee, So, & Leung, 2015; Sima, 
2011; Rauchfleisch & Schäfer, 2015).  
2.2 Analysing Public Debate  
Several scholars have analysed media discourses around AI in recent years, 
mostly in Western countries. They point out that such discourses are often 
sensationalised (Goode, 2018), industry-driven (Elish and boyd, 2018), and politicized 
(Brennen et al., 2018). For instance, Elish and boyd’s (2018) study on AI rhetoric 
reveals that the business community has manufactured an over-hyped vision of AI, by 
focusing on its potential and exaggerating its methodological capabilities. Similarly, 
Brennen et al. (2018), in news coverage of AI in the UK, detect a prevalence of industry 
concerns, such as concerns around products and initiatives. Our study adds to this 
scholarship.  
In focusing on China, this study analysed an under-researched, yet highly relevant case. 
To understand public and counter-public spheres in China, we used a framework 
proposed by Ferree et al. (2002) and Gerhard and Schäfer (2009). In their analyses of 
abortion and biotechnology debate, they developed a conceptual framework to measure 
public debate around science and technology along three dimensions: standing, framing, 
and positioning.  
• Standing measures the prevalence of different stakeholders in public discourse. 
In any given debate, the stronger a stakeholder’s presence, the more influential 
s/he is likely to be (Ferree et al., 2002).  
• Framing refers to the contextualization and interpretation of a topic. In public 
discourses around technology and science (and other issues), actors make sense 
of, and give meaning to an issue by using frames (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). 
These frames entail the way an issue is viewed. For example, is it a political, 
economic, legal, social, or other issue (Entman, 1993); is it seen as a problem; 
and what measures should be taken by responsible parties in relation to it 
(Gerhard and Schaefer, 2009: 441)?  
• Building on Ferree et al.’s (2002) framework, Gerhards and Schäfer (2009) 
added positioning as a third dimension. Positioning describes the prevalence of 
different evaluations of a topic (Gerhard & Schäfer, 2009). For example, what is 
a stakeholder’s position on an issue, and how is that position presented (i.e. 
positively or negatively) in the debate in general (Schäfer, 2007)? 
We employed all three dimensions to analyse public discourses around AI in China. In 
our study, PD represents the authoritative realm where the party state’s official 
narratives about AI are propagated. In contrast, WeChat represents a potential counter-
public where multiple actors and narratives can coexist, and contest various issues. To 
assess to what extent the discussion around AI on WeChat serves as a ‘counter-public 
sphere’ that challenges the official discourses presented in PD, we compared both 
platforms. To this end, we asked the following questions:  
RQ1 – Standing: How diverse is the spectrum of actors participating in AI debates on 
WeChat? 
RQ2 – Framing: How does the framing around AI differ among actors on WeChat, and 
between WeChat and PD? 
RQ3 – Positioning: How does sentiment about AI differ among actors on WeChat, and 
between WeChat and PD? 
3. Methods  
3.1 Data collection  
As WeChat does not have application programming interfaces (APIs), we used a 
Selenium-based web crawler to retrieve articles published by its public accounts (Fu, 
2018). The crawler visited, and sent the search query ‘฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ’ (‘artificial intelligence’) 
to, a third-party search engine – sogou.com – where historical WeChat posts from 
public accounts are archived. Using the time filter function of Sogou, the crawler 
collected the 100 articles that were most relevant to the search term from each day of 
our study period: 1 January 2015 to 1 October 2018. The rationale behind setting 2015 
as the starting point for the data collection was that the Chinese government launched 
its official AI agenda in that year. We terminated the crawler on 1 October 2018 to 
begin data analysis. Using another web crawler, we collected news articles from PD’s 
online search engine – search.people.com.cn – using the same search keyword and 
timeframe. In total, we collected 128,343 WeChat articles and 20,666 PD articles. 
3.2 Standing 
We employed multi-step coding to identify the actors participating in public 
discourse surrounding AI on WeChat. We used a weighted sample of WeChat public 
profiles (n = 1,100) from the dataset, and manually annotated them based on 
information provided in them (i.e. each account's identity verification and function 
description). In the second step, we organized the labels used for this annotation into 
categories based on their interrelationship. Seven categories emerged from the data: 1) 
media organization; 2) tech company; 3) non-tech company; 4) academic; 5) 
government institution; 6) civil society; and 7) non-institutional account. A detailed 
codebook with examples is included in Appendix A.  
For validation, a second coder coded a random subset of 110 user profiles, using the 
same codebook. Inter-coder reliability was calculated using Cohen’s Kappa, and 
showed a high degree of agreement between coders (κ= .94). 
3.3 Framing  
To investigate the frames used to discuss AI, we employed a two-step 
procedure. The first step focused on identifying prevalent topics from both WeChat and 
PD using Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) (Blei et al., 2003). Jieba toolkit (Qin & 
Wu, 2019) was used to generate tokenized versions of articles. We then adopted Maier 
et al.’s (2018) approach to further pre-process data, and validate different LDA models2. 
Based on the evaluation of topic words, sample articles, and interactive visualizations of 
LDA, we agreed on topic numbers (k) of 30 and 20 for the most interpretable models 
 
 2 This pre-processing step involved removing stop words, sparse terms, and dense terms. We 
trained LDA models with combinations of k (k = {10, 20, … ,80}) and hyper-parameter Alpha 
(alpha = {.005, .01, .05, .1, .2, .5, 1}). Beta was set at 1/k (Maier et al., 2018). For each k, we 
selected a model with the best topic coherence. 
for WeChat and PD, respectively. After removing ‘boilerplate’ topics3, 26 topics were 
eventually identified in the WeChat corpus and 17 in the PD corpus.  
In the second step, the identified topics were qualitatively labelled, and grouped into 
frames by three of the study’s authors (Figure 1). For this task, we adopted six frames 
from the Science Communication literature (Gerhards & Schäfer, 2010; Schäfer, 2009), 
as follows:  
● The economic frame covers discussion about the economic and financial 
impacts of AI, on both macroeconomic and microeconomic levels. Topics 
discussed under this frame included e-commerce, venture capital, and consumer 
products.  
● The scientific frame includes discussion of the scientific aspects of AI 
development and application. Examples of topics under this frame included 
research output and science and technology events. 
● The entertainment frame covers discussions of AI in the contexts of popular 
culture, entertainment, sports, and the arts. Movies and DeepMind playing Go 
were the most common topics within this frame. 
● The socio-ethical frame consists of critical reflection on AI’s impact on human 
society and related ethical issues. Topics grouped under this frame included AI 
risks and threats, and ethics.  
● The educational frame addresses the issue of educational institutions’ 
appropriate response to AI. Topics related to this frame included school 
curriculum and higher education.  
● The political frame refers to discussions of AI in the context of government 
policies, government regulation, and the geopolitical impacts of AI. For example, 
China’s national development plan and regulation were related to this frame.  
Using two LDA models, we calculated the thetas (θf)4 of the six frames for each article. 
The θf can be interpreted as the prominence of a specific frame in an article. For 
simplicity’s sake, we refer to θf as ‘theta’ in the subsequent sections. Following 
 
3 ‘Boilerplate’ topics are those reflecting general language-usage features. 
4 Our LDA models could generate the topic membership probability θt of an article for all topics. 
These probabilities are mutually exclusive for each article, i.e. θt1 + θt2 + … + θtk = 1. Suppose 
we grouped t1, t2 and t9 into frame x (fx). The frame membership of an article to frame x (θfx) is 
equal to the sum of θt1 ,θt2 and θt9 . According to the sum rule, θfx can be interpreted as the 
probability of an article falling into t1, t2 or t9. 
Griffiths and Steyvers (2004), we constructed the time series of mean theta for each 
frame, and for each actor group.  
[insert Figure 1 here] 
3.4 Positioning 
In this study, we used sentiment as a proxy for actors’ positioning on AI. We 
conducted a sentiment analysis using the National Taiwan University Semantic 
Dictionary (NTUSD; Ku et al., 2006). We quantified the sentiment of an article using 
Relative risk (RR), which is calculated by dividing the number of positive words by the 
number of negative words plus one, in an article5. This metric measures the excess 
positive sentiment of an article with respect to the negative sentiment.  
The accuracy of the dictionary we used can be undermined by its domain-specificity 
(González-Bailón & Paltoglou, 2015; Ribeiro et al., 2016), so validation was necessary. 
Therefore, we validated the dictionary against human-coded sentiment (Haselmayer and 
Jenny, 2016). The validation results indicate that our sentiment metrics captured the 
sentiment of AI-related content (Appendix B). 
4. Results  
4.1 Standing  
In the Chinese public sphere, PD represents the voice of the CPC government 
(Wu, 2014; Zhao, 1998). In contrast, social media such as WeChat host a wider range of 
actors. Therefore, the first research question asked how present different actors were in 
public discourse about AI on WeChat. Through a qualitative study of profiles of 
WeChat public accounts, we identified seven categories of actors. The numbers of 
accounts and articles were used to measure the prevalence of each actor category.  
The first category – industry actors – consisted of verified WeChat accounts that were 
affiliated with private companies. This was the most prominent actor category on 
 
5 In Epidemiology, RR is commonly calculated by the division of two risks. To translate this 
concept into our sentiment analysis, we calculated the RR by dividing the ratio of positive 
words by the ratio of negative words. Because the bases of the two ratios are the same, the RR 
value equals the number of positive words divided by the number of negative words. We added 
one to the number of negative words to solve the problem of division by zero. 
WeChat, making up 46.2 percent of all coded accounts. Among these, technology 
companies such as Microsoft and Tencent were the most prominent, accounting for 28.7 
percent of all profiles. Non-tech companies, on the other hand, made up 17.5 percent of 
this category. These corporate accounts were comparatively active on WeChat, 
contributing 15,695 articles – more than the sum of articles from all other actors in the 
sample (Table 1).  
Nine point nine percent of accounts were registered by media organizations, including 
newspaper and television stations. These organizations published an average of 17.3 
articles per account; this meant that they were considerably less active than industry 
actors.  
Academic actors referred to verified accounts owned by educational or academic 
research institutions. While universities and their affiliated research institutions 
represented a large proportion of the academic actors, their accounts constituted only 
4.9 percent of the sample. However, with an average of 39.5 articles per account, they 
were among the most active actors in the AI debate on WeChat. 
Government and civil society actors included government agencies, NGOs, religious 
groups, and charity organizations. Accounts affiliated with the government and civil 
society groups constituted 5.2 percent of the sample. The remaining coded WeChat 
profiles either belonged to accounts that were not affiliated with any verified institution, 
or no longer existed. 
[insert Table 1 here] 
4.2 Framing  
To compare how AI was framed, we calculated the probability of different 
platforms and actors using specific frames (as explained in Section 3.2). The results are 
presented in Figure 2. 
[insert Figure 2 here] 
As the government’s mouthpiece (Wu, 2014), PD mostly – and unsurprisingly – 
engaged with the economic and political frames. The vast majority of PD articles within 
these two frames were related to the central government’s policies, and promoted 
narratives around AI’s potential to boost China’s economic and political power.  
On WeChat, the economic frame was the most commonly used frame across all actor 
groups. The second most commonly used frame on this platform was the scientific 
frame, which included discussion of the scientific and technical aspects of AI 
development. It is worth noting that the scientific frame was discussed not only by 
academic accounts, but also by government and industry actors. More precisely, while 
the academic community published articles about AI-related research output and 
academic events, government and industry actors’ discussions within the scientific 
frame related mainly to the significance of AI research and the technical aspect of AI-
empowered consumer products.  
Civil society groups and government institutions were the most active promoters of the 
political frame on WeChat, and their framing of AI followed a similar pattern. For 
example, both civil society groups and government institutions frequently published 
content similar to PD’s news articles – that is, articles that discussed the strategic 
significance of China becoming an ‘AI superpower’. Our analysis also shows that civil 
society groups were the least engaging actors when it came to discussing the socio-
ethical concerns around AI, such as the impact of AI on human society, and the ethical 
implications of AI development (i.e. the socio-ethical frame). In comparison, academic 
and media actors were relatively more active in addressing these critical topics. 
To compare frames used on PD and WeChat, we compared each frame’s mean theta 
(Table 2). Our analysis reveals that the economic frame dominated AI discussion on PD 
and WeChat, with a mean theta higher than .37 in both cases. The most significant 
disparity between these two platforms lies in their concern for the socio-ethical frame: 
while it is the third most common frame on WeChat, there is no prevalent topic under 
this frame on PD. The time series plots displayed in Figure 3 and Figure 4 illustrate the 
temporal evolution of frames; for example, the time series for WeChat’s socio-ethical 
frame illustrates that discussion around AI’s socio-ethical implications has sharply 
decreased on this platform in recent years.  
The time series analysis also shows that the economic frame was constantly the most 
prominent on both platforms, although a slight decrease can be observed on WeChat. 
Meanwhile, the prominence of the entertainment frame on WeChat and PD fluctuated 
with media events. For instance, the releases of AI-related movies and DeepMind’s 
participation in Go tournaments sharply boosted the number of articles under the 
entertainment frame.  
Meanwhile, the political frame responded to the central government’s release of AI-
related policies6, as exemplified by China’s 2017 Development Plan for AI. In 2017, the 
Chinese State Council published an official Development Plan to make China the 
‘innovation centre for AI’ (SCS, 2017), and this received extensive coverage on PD. On 
WeChat, a large number of articles were also published by experts to explain the plan’s 
implications and significance for lay citizens.  
 
[insert Table 2 here] 
[insert Figure 3 here] 
[insert Figure 4 here] 
 
4.3 Positioning 
To measure the sentiment in each article, we calculated its relative risk (RR), 
which indicated whether it showed more positive or negative sentiment. For example, 
articles about China and Chinese researchers’ achievements in AI often scored the 
highest in RR. In contrast, articles discussing AI’s threats to human societies generally 
received the lowest RR. We first broke down our sentiment analysis results from the 
WeChat data into seven groups of actors, in order to compare each group’s RR (Figure 
5). The results show that all actor groups discuss AI in a predominantly positive way 
(all RR> 3.2). In particular, government (RR=5.05), civil society (RR=4.41), and 
academic institutions (RR=4.16), have the most positive sentiment scores.  
A comparison of the sentiment between WeChat and PD revealed that AI-related 
content on both platforms showed significantly more positive than negative attitude 
towards AI (RR= 3.29 & 4.47). Furthermore, time series analysis of the sentiment 
metrics (Figure 6) indicates that this positive sentiment continues to increase. The 
Spearman’s rank correlations of RR with time are 0.623 and 0.278 for WeChat and PD 
respectively, suggesting that the sentiment on both platforms grew more positive over 
the four years. A particularly high growth rate was observed on WeChat. This is in line 
 
6 Through an analysis of governmental policy documents, we developed a timeline of key AI-
related policies launched in the past four years in China to interpret time series data in context 
(Appendix C). 
with the platform’s increasingly prominent discussion about AI’s political and 
technological potency, and its declining focus on its socio-ethical implications. Articles 
with the lowest RR scores often included the socio-ethical frame, such as discussion 
around the risks of malfunctioning robots threatening human society. A continuing 
decrease in the number of articles under this category (as mentioned earlier) helped to 
boost the overall RR of WeChat.  
[Insert Figure 5 here] 
[Insert Figure 6 here] 
 
5. Discussion  
This study investigated the hypothetical role of WeChat – as a counter-public 
sphere in China – in challenging the official state media narratives about AI. Focusing 
on three dimensions of public discussion – standing, framing, and position – this study 
compared WeChat and PD’s four year output (2015 to late 2018) of online articles 
about AI. This comparison showed that WeChat played a limited role as a counter-
public sphere in challenging PD’s narratives about the economic and political potency 
of AI.  
The economic interest in the country’s AI development is extensive, and highly relevant 
to various sectors. According to one estimate (Rao et al., 2017), AI could provide a 26 
percent boost to China’s GDP by 2030, thus making it the world’s largest economic 
beneficiary of AI. This economic motivation behind China’s ambitions for AI is well 
reflected in PD’s excessive focus on the economic frame. When interwoven political 
and economic interests combine to materialise China’s (so-called) ‘AI dream’, the 
resulting positioning of the technology in the media is predictably rosy. As 
demonstrated by our sentiment analysis, the state media adopts an exceedingly 
favourable attitude to AI, and this positivity is increasing.  
Against the background of this one-sided and overconfident interpretation of AI in the 
official discourse, a counter-public sphere should present a standing that goes beyond 
interest groups; promote frames other than the purely economic; and take a position that 
examines the ethical and social implications of technology more critically.  
With regard to standing, our analysis of user profiles on WeChat reveals a diversity of 
social actors. These actors included industry institutions, government, academia, the 
media, and civil society. However, this actor diversity did not necessarily result in an 
equal distribution of influence: industry actors were still the most prevalent and visible 
actors on WeChat, and they contributed most of the AI-related content.  
In the case of framing, our findings show that all actor groups were united in their 
promotion of the economic frame on WeChat. One surprisingly active participant in 
promoting this frame was academia. It is worth pointing out that academic actors’ close 
engagement in discussion of the economic impacts of AI should be interpreted within 
the context of a growing collaboration between academic institutions and industries. As 
in other countries, Chinese AI researchers are often involved in both academic and 
industry sectors (Larson, 2018).  
Results from this study reveal that civil society groups served as an amplifier of 
political and economic frames. This seemingly surprising finding needs to be put into 
perspective by looking at the relationship between civil society organisations and 
political institutions in China. As Chinese civil society groups rely on the government 
for their existence, they need to maintain a close and harmonious relationship with the 
authorities and, thus, do not challenge them (Dai, Zeng, & Wang, 2017; Hsu & 
Hasmath, 2014). This explains why civil society groups’ framing of AI focused on the 
economic aspect of its development, thus adopting an almost identical approach to that 
of the government.  
Findings related to the socio-ethical frame offer key insights into the assessment of 
WeChat’s role as a counter-public sphere. As Wagner et al. (2002: 341) point out, the 
public is motivated to develop an understanding of new technology. This motivation is 
not fuelled by its unfamiliarity, however, but by controversies that surround it. Likewise, 
Goode (2018) also argues that controversy is crucial in stimulating the public’s critical 
reflection on emerging technologies. In the context of the current study, such 
controversy can be epitomized in the socio-ethical frame. Our analysis shows that 
WeChat did bring public attention to this crucial subject, despite its absence on PD. At 
the same time, the time series analysis indicates that the prevalence of the socio-ethical 
frame has been declining sharply over the past five years. This trend implies that AI 
discussions on WeChat are becoming increasingly homogeneous, as critical voices 
weaken.  
In the case of positioning, our analysis reveals the same growing positive sentiment 
toward AI on WeChat as there is on PD. On the one hand, this finding reflects the 
general openness to, and enthusiasm for digital technology in the wider Chinese society 
(Lv, 2005; Kostka, 2018). On the other hand, it underscores the need for experts to 
shake the public out of their complacency.  
As previously mentioned, an over-hyped and economy-focused coverage of AI is not 
unique to Chinese media, but has also been documented in prior studies of Western 
media (Brennen et al., 2018; Elish and boyd, 2018). What is different in China is the 
continuing absence of vocal and influential communities that reveal the ‘blind spots’ 
within the current AI discourse. In Europe and the US, an expanding league of activists 
and scholars have been actively advocating for, and raising awareness of, ethical, 
accountable, and sustainable AI development7. In China, the responsibility to foster a 
similar movement is now on the shoulders of researchers, especially those with social 
science and humanities backgrounds.  
6. Conclusion  
In Cath et al.’s (2018) vision of a ‘good AI society’ for the US, EU, and the UK, 
AI’s power should be fully steered towards promoting the public good. In the case of 
China, what constitutes the public good, and the way it can be delivered, relies on a 
rational and inclusive counter-public sphere. In such a sphere, grassroots discourse 
challenges official doctrines. Existing literature often depicts new communication 
technologies in China as a counter-public sphere that competes against the heavily 
regulated mainstream media (Lee, So, & Leung, 2015; Sima, 2011; Rauchfleisch & 
Schäfer, 2015). However, our study suggests that social media’s role as a counter-public 
sphere in AI discourses is minimal.  
The lack of a counter-public sphere to influence China’s vision and strategies related to 
AI can be detrimental. When an entire nation – from academia to the business sphere 
and from the government to civil society – is collectively and uncritically working on 
AI’s rapid expansion, the consequences can be severe. As demonstrated by the recent 
CRISPR babies scandal in China (Kuo, 2018), when ambition overrules regulation and 
 
7 Some sample institutions include The Institute for Ethical AI & Machine Learning (UK); The 
AI Now Institute (US); and The Future of Life Institute (US). 
when self-interest overrules ethical consideration, technological ‘innovation’ can have 
profound consequences. Similarly, in the case of China’s AI development, if the current 
trajectory continues to be driven solely by political and economic interests, the results 
can have irreversibly devastating consequences.  
The future trajectory of China’s AI dream remains hard to predict. Our analysis shows 
that the official rhetoric about AI is highly responsive to external events. A single policy 
change from the central government can drastically alter the AI sector. The powerful 
influence of the Chinese government can be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, 
the official AI discourse exercises a hegemonic power over public opinion on the issue, 
thus limiting healthy debate and critical reflection. On the other, this centralised power 
grants Chinese authorities a certain responsive advantage over its Western counterparts 
when it comes to quickly and effectively implementing policies. For example, if the 
government saw an advantage in approaching AI development with more caution and 
critical reflection, it could, in theory, quickly alter its trajectory and implement policies 
to reflect this new approach.  
The shift mentioned above is not impossible. In Europe and the US, transparency and 
accountability are held as two fundamental values to guide policymakers’ AI schemes 
(Cath et al., 2018). If China wants to become a real ‘AI superpower’ and compete 
against these two powers, it has to catch up in, even lead, the development of a 
substantive ethical framework. As this paper is being written, the US-China trade war is 
still unfolding. One important lesson for China to learn from the US sanctions on its 
technology products is that both China and its technology sector have to work to rebuild 
the West’s trust. Setting a high ethical standard with regards to transparency and 
accountability might be an effective starting point.  
There are limitations to this study. First, Chinese social media are heavily regulated, and 
criticism of the central government is heavily censored. Some AI-related articles on 
WeChat, for example, might have been censored. To investigate this possibility, we 
used an archive of censored WeChat posts – FreeWeChat (McDevitt, 2016) – to search 
for deleted posts on the AI topic. This search (in December 2019) returned only four 
articles that contained the term ‘artificial intelligence’ (฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ ), and none of these 
discussed AI as its main topic. Furthermore, earlier research of online censorship in 
China suggests that discussion of non-politically sensitive topics is less prone to 
censorship (Fu, Chan, & Chau, 2013; King, Pan, and Roberts, 2014; Zeng, Chan, Fu, 
2018). While we cannot entirely eliminate the possibility that articles might have been 
censored, both our investigation of archived deleted social media posts and previous 
studies, suggest that censorship has a limited impact.  
Second, we chose a dictionary-based approach to develop a preliminary sentiment 
profile of the 140,000 articles collected and analysed in this study. Even though we 
employed manual coding for validation, dictionary-based approaches to assessing 
sentiment still have certain shortcomings, such as the over-simplification of human 
perception of emotion in a text (González-Bailón & Paltoglou, 2015; Ribeiro et al., 
2016; Puschmann, 2018). Future studies should consider conducting sentiment analysis 
on this large data set with machine learning tools, which use human-coding to train 
sentiment assessment algorithms (González-Bailón & Paltoglou, 2015). 
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Appendix A: codebook for actors   
[insert Table 3 here] 
Appendix B: Validation of NTUSD 
 
We randomly selected 500 articles from our WeChat and PD corpora. We 
restricted our inclusion criteria to articles less than 1500 words in order to reduce the 
cognitive loading of the crowd-coding task (Mohammad & Turney, 2010). 
 
We used the crowdsourcing platform – Figure Eight (figure-eight.com) – for this task. 
Participants understand Simplified Chinese and English. They were asked to code each 
article’s sentiment using a 4-point ordinal scale. Figure 7 shows a screenshot of the 
crowd-coding screen. 
[insert Figure 7 here] 
For each article, three coding results from different participants were collected. We 
calculated the human-coded sentiment scores by averaging the result from three coders. 
Figure 8 shows the scatterplot of human-coded scores and relative risk metrics derived 
from NTUSD. A regression line is also displayed. 
The correlation between the two variables is statistically significant (Pearson’s 
correlation: 0.238, p < 0.0001). Because ‘off-the-shelf’ sentiment dictionaries are 
commonly used without revalidation, there is no established threshold of correlation for 
accepting a dictionary. However, by comparing our result with a handful of priors 
attempts to revalidate off-the-shelf dictionaries (Haselmayer & Jenny, 2016; Boukes et 
al., 2019), we can argue that our validation result is acceptable. As the correlation is 
statistically significant, we deem the criterion validity of our measurement to be 
adequate. 
[insert Figure 8 here]  
Appendix C Timeline of Chinese government’s AI policies  








Table 1. Summary of actor categories. 
Actor categories Accounts (in %) Number of 
articles 
Average number of 










2,711              14.1 





2,133  39.5 
governmental institutions 3.6 
n=40 
411  10.3 
Civil Society 1.6 
n=18 
251  13.9 
non-institutional accounts 30.7 
n=338 
4,433  13.1 
Other 3.0 
n=33 
526  15.9 
  
Table 2. Framing in AI articles – Mean theta (95% Confidence Interval)] 
  WeChat 
(n = 124,711) 
PD 
(n = 20,666) 
Economic frame 0.376 (0.375 to 0.378) 0.398 (0.0296 to 0.402) 
Scientific frame 0.165 (0.164 to 0.166) 0.116 (0.114 to 0.119) 
Socio-ethical frame 0.0878 (0.0871 to 0.0886)   
Entertainment frame 0.0823 (0.0816 to 0.0830) 0.0866 (0.0845 to 
0.0888) 
Political frame 0.0804 (0.0797 to 0.0810) 0.135 (0.132 to 0.137) 






Table 3. Codebook for actors   
 
Category Description Example  
Media 
organisation 
The account explicitly indicates that the account is associated with a media 
organisation, including newspapers, magazines, television, and new media 
companies. Individuals authenticated with these media organisations were also 
coded under this category. 
• Qinhuangdao Daily 










The account explicitly indicates that it is associated with a technology or an IT 







The account explicitly indicates that it is associated with non-tech and non-media 
institutions. Individuals authenticated with these companies were also coded under 
this category. 
• Red Star Macalline 
• Guotai Junan Securities 
Academic The account explicitly indicates that it is associated with an academic or educational 
institution Individuals authenticated with these institutions were also coded under this 
category. 
• Tsinghua University 
• Chinese Academic of Science  
Governmental 
institutions 
The account explicitly indicates that the account is associated with a central or 
regional governmental body. Individuals authenticated with these institutions were 
also coded under this category. 
• Jiang Yin Municipal Commission of 
Economy and Informatization, 
• SME Bureau of Chongqing 
Civil Society The account explicitly indicates that the account is associated with civil society 
organisations, including NGOs, charitable organizations, religion-based 
organizations, and professional associations. Individuals authenticated with these 
organizations were also coded under this category. 
• Human Resource Non-Governmental 
Organization, 
• Shanghai Jiading Fanxiejiao 
Association 
Non-institutional  Accounts without authentication as an institution. • Renwu story 
Other Accounts’ associated with users other than the categories listed above, or accounts 
that no longer exist. 
• FilmHorn,  
• Leifeng Wang  
0 
 




Issuing Body Policy Title 
2015 May State Council Made in China 2015 
2015 July State Council Guiding Opinions of the State Council on Vigorously 
Advancing the "Internet Plus" Action 
2016 March National 
Congress 
Outline of the 13th Five-Year Plan for the National 
Economic and Social Development of the PRC 
2016 April MI, NDRC, MF Robot industrial developing plan(2016-2020) 
2016 May NDRC, MST, 
MIIT, CCAC 
‘Internet Plus’ Artificial Intelligence Three-Year Action 
Implementation Plan 
2016 July MST Circular of the State Council on Issuing the National 
Scientific and Technological Innovation Planning for the 
13th Five Years 
2016 September MIIT, NDRC Innovation and development of intelligent hardware 
industry initiative (2016-2018) 
2016 November State Council the 13th Five-Year National Plan for the Development of 
Strategic Emerging Industries 
2017 March 12th NPCPRC Report on the Work of the Government 2017 
2017 July State Council Notice of the State Council on Issuing the Development 
Plan on the New Generation of Artificial Intelligence 
2017 October CPC 19th CPC National Congress 
2017 December MIIT, MST Three-Year Action Plan for Promoting Development of a 
New Generation Artificial Intelligence Industry (2018–
2020) 
2018 March 13th NPCPRC Report on the Work of the Government 2018 
 
Notes:  PRC: the People’s Republic of China 
MI: Ministry of Industry 
NDRC: National Development and Reform Commission 
MF: Ministry of Finance 
MST: Ministry of Science and Technology 
MIIT: Ministry of Industry and Information Technology 
CCAC: Office of the Central cyberspace affairs commission 

















Figure 2. Average theta for each frame of AI articles published by each actor group. 





Figure 3. Time series of daily mean theta for each frame of AI articles from WeChat (Note: The numbers 





Figure 4. Time series of daily mean theta for each frame of AI articles from PD (Note: The numbers on 




Figure 5. Mean sentiment score (RR) of AI articles from actor groups (Note: The bands around the mean 















Figure 8. Hand-coded sentiment vs NTUSD   
 
 
 
 
